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Differentiation in Pay for Performance Within Organizations: An Occupational 
Perspective 
Purpose: This article addresses the question of why organizations do not uniformly apply pay 
for performance (PFP) throughout the organization, focusing on the wider occupational 
structure in which they and the jobs they create are embedded. We propose a model of 
‘occupational differentiation’ whereby the probability of a job within a given organization 
having PFP increases with levels of monitoring difficulty and requisite human asset specificity 
characterizing the occupation to which a job belongs, being highest in occupations 
characterized by high levels of both (generally managerial and professional occupations). 
Design/methodology/approach: Using the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (a 
nationally-representative matched employer-employee dataset for Britain), this paper 
investigates this question for all 350 occupations delineated by the UK’s Office for National 
Statistics using regression methods that adjust for other confounding factors such as 
demographic factors and workplace fixed-effects. 
Findings: We find organizations ‘occupationally differentiate’ the use of PFP in ways 
consistent with the model i.e., PFP is most likely to be found in occupations characterized by 
both high monitoring difficulty and high requisite human asset specificity (mainly managerial 
and professional occupations) and least likely in occupations scoring low in both. The finding 
holds across PFP types (individual, group, organizational), whether organizations are large or 
small, and hold across most industrial sectors. 
Research limitations/implications: The main implication of this study is that organizations 
appear to be taking into consideration whether the wider profession to which a job belongs 
when implementing PFP, irrespective of their own HRM strategies and organizational context. 
There are a few limitations to this study, with the main one being that empirical support is only 
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found in the private sector. The public sector appears to be beyond the reach of the model, 
where PFP is generally rarer. A second limitation is that the dataset is from 2011 and only 
covers a single country.  
Practical implications: Given organizations appear to be implementing PFP based on 
occupation, this may lead to equity concerns as different groups are being treated differently 
within organizations based upon their occupational group. 
Social implications: Since PFP jobs tend to pay more than non-PFP jobs and PFP prevalence 
has been growing, by being more likely to implement it for generally high-paid groups 
(generally higher managerial and professional occupations), PFP may contribute to wider pay 
differentials within and between organizations. 
Originality/value: By introducing the occupational-level of analysis and the differential nature 
of tasks across occupational groups, the model offers a new midrange, sociological perspective 
to understanding intra-organizational dynamics in PFP-use, and potentially HR practices more 
broadly. 
Key words: 
Compensation; Performance pay; HR differentiation; Occupations. 




Pay for performance (PFP) is a critical tool used by organizations to align interests of 
employees to theirs. Understanding where and why organizations make use of such pay 
systems has been a key concern in the compensation literature. While the literature is rich in 
accounts mapping and explaining inter-organization dynamics in PFP-use, research exploring 
intra-organization dynamics has been lacking. However, an emerging set of statistical 
regularities does in fact suggest organizations differentiate the use of PFP within their 
boundaries and that this differentiation takes on an occupational form (Bayo-Moriones et al. 
2013; Yanadori and Kang 2011) suggesting it is something in need of explanation. There are 
wider implications to studying this question for practice and for society. For instance, previous 
research has shown that differential PFP-use within organizations can lead to poorer work 
attitudes (Marescaux et al. 2013), while other research has shown that not only do PFP jobs 
pay more (Green and Heywood 2016), the rise in PFP has contributed to growing wage 
inequality (Bryan and Bryson 2016).  
In this article, we propose a model which suggests that who gets PFP within a given 
organization to a great extent depends on the characteristics of the occupation to which a job 
belongs. While previous research tended to focus on jobs (a collection of tasks), sociologists 
often focus on occupations (aggregations of jobs with functionally similar tasks). Building on 
the sociological theory of occupational class, a theory commonly used in sociology to denote 
socio-economic positions of advantage and disadvantage based on occupational position, we 
develop a straightforward model which suggests monitoring difficulty and requisite human 
asset specificity are differentially bundled across occupations. In this paper, difficulty of 
monitoring refers to the degree of difficulty in measuring, observing, and controlling the quality 
and quantity of tasks as they are performed (i.e., performance), while requisite human asset 
specificity refers to the degree to which tasks require specialist knowledge to do them and so 
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the ease of replacing a worker to perform them (i.e., turnover costs). Given this expected 
differential bundling of these two task dimensions across occupations, PFP should be even 
more likely among jobs belonging to occupations characterized by high levels of both. Using a 
nationally-representative matched employer-employee sample of British workplaces, findings 
generally support the model. 
There are at least two theoretical contributions to be made from introducing and 
validating an occupational perspective to understanding intra-organizational dynamics in PFP-
use. First, by delving within the organization, such an exploration moves beyond the so-called 
‘universalistic’ accounts of HR practices. The existing literature’s focus on inter-organization 
variation implicitly assumes HR practices—including PFP—are applied fairly uniformly 
throughout the organization to one of intra-organization variation. In this sense, such a 
contribution offers a workforce differentiation perspective to PFP. Second, by drawing on 
sociological theories concerning the importance of the occupational structure for compensation 
and the employment relationship, we introduce a plausible theoretical account as to why the 
wider occupational structure that is common to all organizations is an important contingency 
factor for understanding the differential application of PFP within organizations. Although the 
occupational structure has long been mooted as an underexplored contextual factor in 
organizational research (Johns 2006), how and why it might affect the adoption of HR practices 
has not been explicitly theorized. In doing so, we address calls for the development of midrange 
theories in understanding the design of compensation systems (Heneman 2000; Gooderham et 
al. 2018). By introducing the broader occupational structure that is common to all 
organizations, we introduce a structural variable constraining agency (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983) that is both intra- and inter-organizational. An occupational approach therefore has the 
potential to connect intra-organizational processes to the wider macro environment and vice 
versa with respect to PFP, and perhaps HR practices more broadly. 
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Differentiation in PFP Within Organizations 
PFP refers to additional bonus payments on top of base pay based on either individual, team, 
organizational performance, or some combination.1 PFP aims to increase performance and 
retain better performing staff. A key concern in the literature has been mapping how PFP-use 
varies across organizations, focusing on structural factors such as unionization, sector, and 
national contextual factors (Gooderham et al. 2018). These inter-organizational accounts 
implicitly assume decisions on whether to implement PFP (as well as other HR practices more 
generally) are taken at the organizational-level and have very little to say in terms of which 
groups receive and which groups do not receive PFP within the organization once adopted. A 
conventional focus within this literature has therefore been on identifying critical organization-
level and national-level factors determining the design of compensation systems. Strategic 
choice theorists, for instance, predict that a major determinant of pay systems between 
organizations is the degree of competition in an organization’s product market (Schuler and 
Jackson 1987), perhaps implying little or unimportant variation within organizations. 
An emerging set of research findings suggest employers systematically differentiate 
PFP across occupational groups within organizations (Bayo-Moriones et al. 2013; Yanadori 
and Kang 2011). These studies have only focused on single industrial sectors and a handful of 
occupations, so it is not yet clear whether differentiation in pay systems across occupations 
occurs more widely. However, the basis of the decisions of who gets PFP and who does not 
within organizations has neither been theoretically mapped nor empirically tested directly. We 
build upon the sociological theory of occupational class which implies the nature of the 
occupational task environment is a substantively important determinant of PFP within 
organizations, independent of organizational and industrial context. Our primary contribution 
 
1 Thus our paper is not about piece-rates. 
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in this article is providing a simple theoretical account of the dividing lines along which 
differentiation in PFP occurs by introducing the occupation-level as a significant consideration, 
in line with sociological theories that have long emphasized as important for understanding the 
differentiation in compensation and employment relationships in the labor market (Liu and 
Grusky 2013; Goldthorpe 2007). 
Difficulty of monitoring 
The first area of the task environment we consider concerns difficulty of monitoring. That is, 
the degree of difficulty in measuring, observing, and controlling the quality and quantity of 
tasks as they are performed (i.e., performance). Related constructs such as the difficulty in 
monitoring effort have been a primary variable in the influential principal-agent theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989). In general, prior findings show that PFP is more likely in job roles where 
the tasks are difficult to monitor and control. Many studies have focused on senior executives—
an occupation whose tasks are particularly difficult to closely monitor given the their 
multifaceted and varied nature, and control, given the position of senior executives at the top 
of organizational hierarchies. When studies focus on regular employees, they find that 
managerial-type duties also predict PFP-use. For instance, DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010) find 
that authority delegated to employees increases the probability of PFP within a national-
representative survey of British workplaces. 
Difficulty of monitoring tasks is about more than having managerial duties and 
authority, however. It is about the design of the job and its tasks more broadly. Eisenhardt 
(1988) on a sample of retail workers showed how jobs with low spans of control and simple 
tasks were more likely to pay by time, whereas jobs with wide spans of control and complex 
tasks were more likely to have PFP. Fernie and Metcalf (1998) found that in call centers where 
employees were less closely monitored, employers were more likely to offer PFP jobs. Call 
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centers that had designed tasks to be simple and routine implemented sophisticated electronic 
monitoring mechanisms and so were more likely to pay by time. 
Given the quite varied occupations covered in previous studies, together, the factors 
they highlight as being important can be interpreted through the lens of a more general task-
based underpinning of PFP decisions. As insightful as previous findings are, individual studies 
have tended to focus on only either a single or handful of occupations or a single industry. This 
could be attributed to the lack of theoretical models on the sorts of tasks that are  inherently 
difficult to monitor a priori (Prendergast 1999), which hampers a more general understanding 
of which sorts of jobs or occupations (by way of the tasks they contain) are more likely to adopt 
PFP. Nonetheless, given the foregoing evidence, we expect task monitoring difficulty to play 
an important role in differentiating the use of PFP within organizations. Specifically, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. Monitoring difficulty is positively related to the use of PFP 
Human asset specificity 
A second area of the task environment concerns the degree of requisite human asset specificity 
to do the tasks composing the job or occupation. An influential body of theory suggests that 
organizations often tailor their HR practices such as pay systems to specific job groups (Lepak 
and Snell 1999; 2002; Lepak et al. 2007), sometimes known as the ‘HR differentiation’ or the 
‘workforce differentiation’ perspective (Becker, Huselid, Beaty 2009). In explaining why the 
applicability of different HR practices might be differentiated across job groups within 
organizations, this perspective emphasizes variation in the scope and nature of human capital 
typically used and required across job types within organizations, which in turn, map onto the 
type of employment relationship organizations try to foster with each type of job group, and so 
HR practices (Lepak and Snell 1999). Lepak and Snell (1999) derive a model of differentiation 
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in ‘HR architecture’ and its correspondence with ‘employment modes’. Drawing upon 
transaction cost economics, human capital theory, and the resource-based view of the firm, 
they develop a model of ‘human resource architecture’ with four corresponding ‘employment 
modes’: ‘internal development’, ‘contracting’, ‘acquisition’, and ‘alliance’. The model predicts 
organizations differentiate their employment relationships, and so HR practices, according to 
broad classes of job roles which are inter alia those that are perceived as more central to 
revenue generation (Lepak and Snell 2002; Lepak et al. 2007).  
Central to HR differentiation is what we call human asset specificity, which is generally 
understood to be the extent to which embodied knowledge and experience can be productively 
applied across different contexts, with specific human assets (or ‘skills’) only having 
productive value in a more restrictive set of contexts than those of a more general kind. For 
instance, it is a central feature in models of firm-specific training whereby training investments 
only have productive value for the firm providing it but not others. However, the concept can 
also be applied more broadly to refer to the degree to which productive value would be lost if 
any kind of specialist knowledge was transferred to another job or establishment (Goldthorpe 
2007: 213)—even if it might be productively employed in another job or establishment. In 
short, the degree of human asset specificity (in this broader usage of the term) is the turnover 
costs associated with specific job roles. For the incidence of PFP within organizations, this 
theory implies that the extent to which tasks require and benefit from accumulated and the 
accumulation of specialist knowledge to do them,  across job groups provides the main basis to 
how organizations differentiate HR practices, while organizational factors are of only 
secondary importance.  
Since implementing any HR practice entails additional costs (e.g., PFP payments and 
their administration), they are only adopted when the benefit outweighs the cost. This is 
generally more likely in the case for job groups characterized by tasks requiring high human 
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asset specificity given turnover costs are higher in such situations (e.g., policies that aim to 
improve retention). Groups where the tasks do not require or benefit from high levels of human 
asset specificity are generally more expendable and this is reflected in the HR practices 
regulating their employment relationship (e.g., more insecure contracts). As a general theory 
of HR practices, HR differentiation theory is often tested against combinations of a broad array 
of HR practices (e.g., high involvement practices) which may include PFP among many other 
elements, and evidence is generally supportive (Lepak and Snell 2002; Lepak et al. 2007). 
Although few studies have explored specifically pay systems with respect to the key 
tenets of HR differentiation theory (c.f. Bayo-Moriones et al. 2013), we expect requisite human 
asset specificity to do the tasks to be an important differentiator across job groups within 
organizations with respect to PFP. This is because one of the key purposes of PFP is to foster 
commitment and to retain employees, a need which is greater in job roles where there is scope 
for valuable specific human assets to make a difference to the productive value of the role by 
virtue of the sorts of tasks involved. Indeed, evidence shows bonus jobs tend to pay more 
overall than jobs without bonuses when holding other factors constant, including person-
specific fixed-effects and taking into account the fact that some base pay may be substituted 
by the bonus (Green and Heywood 2016). PFP can therefore act as an ‘efficiency wage’ to help 
retain specific human assets and encourage further investment in them when these can add to 
productive value. Evidence does show that PFP jobs are associated with higher levels of 
organizational commitment and lower employee turnover (Bayo-Moriones and Larraza‐
Kintana 2009), indicating that they often do fulfil this aim.  
According to the HR differentiation perspective, then, PFP then would only be worth 
the cost in job groups where the typical tasks require and have more scope to develop valuable 
specific human assets by virtue of their tasks. In Lepak and Snell’s (1999) terminology, we 
expect PFP, then, to be firmly within the ‘internal development’ employment mode of job roles 
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characterized by high requisite human asset specificity. In job roles with tasks requiring only 
low requisite human asset specificity—where roles are easily filled with an equally productive 
worker from the external labour market (i.e., where turnover costs are low)—there is much less 
need for such costly pay systems. Following on from the foregoing, we therefore expect: 
Hypothesis 2. Human asset specificity is positively related to the use of PFP 
Difficulty of monitoring, human asset specificity, and occupations 
The foregoing discussion suggests that PFP is implemented where tasks are difficult to monitor 
or where tasks require specific human assets to them. Two issues we seek to clarify are, first, 
the extent to which the two dimensions of monitoring difficulty and requisite human asset 
specificity are bundled across occupations (i.e., do job groups where tasks are difficult to 
measure and control as they are being performed also have greater requisite  human asset 
specificity and vice versa), and secondly, whether the two dimensions might interact (i.e., does 
the effect of monitoring difficulty level on PFP probability vary according to requisite human 
asset specificity level and vice versa). 
There is a long tradition in economic sociology which theorizes that occupations are 
deeply institutionalized bundles of jobs sharing similar tasks and rates of pay (Liu and Grusky 
2013). The occupational structure, and associated occupational norms and isomorphism, can 
be thought of as an important structural variable that is common to all organizations (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983), constraining agency. In forming our expectations about the relationship 
between occupations and PFP, we draw on a third theory, the sociological theory of 
occupational class. ‘Occupational class’ is a technical construct denoting a broad groups of 
occupations (‘classes’) sharing similar employment relations and is widely used by sociologists 
as a measure of socio-economic position (Goldthorpe 2007). Occupational class theory states 
that differences in monitoring difficulty and human asset specificity across occupations 
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determine broad types of employment contract (Goldthorpe 2007). It further assumes that the 
two dimensions are differentially bundled together across occupations such that occupations 
involving tasks that are very difficult to monitor do not necessarily also have scope for high 
levels of human asset specificity and vice versa.  
According to the theory, in occupational classes with both high monitoring difficulty 
and high requisite human asset specificity scope ‘managerial and professional occupations’), 
employees are more difficult to directly control and are more costly to replace so organizations 
adopt a ‘service relationship’ which is characterized by an exchange of a more diffuse kind 
such that employees are salaried rather than paid hourly, job tenures are longer, and internal 
labor markets offer greater opportunities for advancement and retention. Conversely, in 
occupational classes with both low monitoring difficulty and low scope for human asset 
specificity ‘manual and routine occupations’) employees are easy to directly control and more 
costly to replace so organizations adopt ‘labor contracts’ which are characterized by an 
exchange of a more specific kind such that employees are hourly paid rather than salaried, have 
greater job insecurity, and offer little opportunities for advancement. In occupational classes 
with low (high) monitoring difficulty and high (low) requisite human asset specificity scope 
(‘intermediate occupations’), organizations adopt ‘mixed’ employment relationships 
combining elements of the above two types (Goldthorpe 2007). Although the general service 
relationship/labour contract distinction has been repeatedly empirically validated (e.g., 
McGovern et al. 2007), scarce research has examined the assumption of whether the two task 
dimensions highlighted in the theory really are differentially bundled across the occupational 
categories (‘classes’) that are used to denote employment relationship types. 
  Since occupational class theory assumes monitoring difficulty and requisite human 
asset specificity are differentially bundled across occupations, we expect to observe this in the 
data. Furthermore, given this differential bundling, we expect the effect of monitoring difficulty 
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to vary according to level of human asset specificity and vice versa. This is because PFP 
schemes involve their own costs (Prendergast 1999). As previously mentioned, costs include 
the additional payments themselves and their administration such as appraising or measuring 
performance. This means that two occupations with very different levels of monitoring 
difficulty may end up having similar PFP probabilities if they both involve very low human 
asset specificity scope. This is because simply replacing persistent poorly performing 
employees in low human asset specificity occupations is a cheaper than developing and 
administering a PFP scheme. For instance, the PFP probability of van drivers (high monitoring 
difficulty, low asset specificity) should be similar to hospital porters (low monitoring difficulty, 
low asset specificity) even though it is costlier to monitor tasks in the former than the latter 
because employees in both occupations have low scope to benefit from or for developing 
valuable specific human assets. The threat of replacement or the ability to use insecure 
contracts can reduce agency issues in such cases. 
The same is also predicted for the other way around. There should be little difference 
in PFP probability between high and low asset specificity occupations when monitoring 
difficulties are very low. For instance, aircraft pilots and assembly line workers have very 
different scope for human asset specificity use or development while their monitoring 
difficulties are both (similarly) very low. Even though aircraft pilots require high levels of 
human asset specificity, there is very little need for PFP schemes given the organization can 
closely monitor their minute-to-minute, second-to-second performance. Organizations can use 
other ways to retain star performers such as non-pecuniary benefits or career ladders in 
occupations where human asset specificity is important but monitoring is easy. Thus although 
in general organizations differentiate PFP according to monitoring difficulty and requisite 
human asset specificity, the effects are much smaller at low levels of the other variable because 
of the costs involved in PFP schemes. 
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By extension, the interaction effect we are proposing implies that PFP should be most 
likely found in occupations characterized by both high monitoring difficulty and high requisite 
human asset specificity. The marginal gain from a PFP scheme is even greater in these 
situations relative to situations where an occupation scores highly in just one of the two 
variables. Although previous empirical research in the PFP literature has implicitly identified 
an interaction between monitoring difficulty and requisite human asset specificity (DeVaro and 
Prasad 2015), it has rarely been tested. A graphical representation of our expectations of the 
interaction effect can be found in Figure 1. We expect PFP probability to be greatest in 
occupations falling into the upper-right quadrant and be lowest in the lower-left quadrant, being 
intermediate in the off-diagonals. More formally, we expect: 
Hypothesis 3. Difficulty of monitoring and human asset specificity are differentially bundled 
across occupations such that they are only weakly correlated with one another. 
Hypothesis 4. The effects of monitoring difficulty and human asset specificity depend on 
levels of each other such that PFP probability is greatest where both monitoring difficulty 
and human asset specificity are high, lowest where both are low, and low where levels of one 
is very low. 
 [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Data and analytical strategy 
Data 
To address these hypotheses, we draw upon the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS) (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills et al. 2015). WERS is a 
nationally-representative sample of around 2,000 British workplaces with 5 or more 
employees. The strength of WERS for our purposes is that participating workplaces were 
invited to randomly distribute an employee survey to up to 25 employees within them, yielding 
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a matched employer-employee sample of around 20,000 employees nested within workplaces. 
WERS is considered the most authoritative survey of its kind in the world (van Wanrooy et al. 
2013). 
Given the matched employer-employer structure of WERS, it allows for an exploration 
on whether PFP is occupationally differentiated within workplaces, representing a strength over 
other studies which examine only the workplace-level or broad categories of employees within 
the workplace. After removing workplaces with a single employee respondent, workplaces 
with no employees reporting PFP, respondents younger than 20 and those older than 60, and 
respondents with missing data on variables of interest, we are left with a sample of around 
8,400 employees based in around 780 workplaces. 
Measures 
The primary focus is whether  monitoring difficulty, human asset specificity scope, and their 
interaction predict receiving PFP for a given employee within a given PFP workplace. In the 
Survey of Employees component of WERS, sampled employees are asked ‘Which of the 
following do you receive in your job here?’ and are given various options relating to pay 
systems. We focus on three of them: (1) ‘Payments based on your individual performance or 
output’ (e.g., merit pay); (2) ‘Payments based on the overall performance of a group or a team’ 
(e.g., gain sharing); (3) ‘Payments based on the overall performance of your workplace or 
organization (e.g., profit-sharing scheme)’. Respondents ticking any of (1) to (3) are classified 
as receiving PFP and is the main dependent variable, although we disaggregate the different 
forms of PFP and their combinations in a robustness analyses. 
The main independent variables of interest are the tightness of supervision (a proxy for 
difficulty of monitoring) and the extent to which an employees’ job requires specialist 
knowledge to perform it (a proxy for requisite human asset specificity). This information is 
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derived at the occupational-level from the nationally-representative British Skills and 
Employment Surveys (SES) (Felstead et al. 2014). The SES has been collecting nationally-
representative information on a battery of job tasks—including measures of monitoring 
difficulty and the level of required specialist knowledge. Difficulty of monitoring is captured 
by the item: ‘How closely are you supervised in your job?’ with the possible responses ‘Very 
closely’, ‘Quite closely’, ‘Not very closely’, and ‘Not at all closely’ ranging from 1 to 4. Human 
asset specificity is captured by the item: ‘In your job, how important is specialist knowledge 
and understanding?’ with the possible responses ‘Essential’, ‘Very important’, ‘Fairly 
important’, ‘Not very important’, and ‘Not at all important/Does not apply’. These two items 
or ones similar to them have been shown in previous exercises to have good construct and 
criterion validity (McGovern et al. 2007; Williams 2017).  
Responses to both items were reverse-coded and mean occupational-level scores from 
the pooled 2006 and 2012 SES mapped samples onto 3-digit occupation codes of sampled 
employees in WERS.2 We pool the two latest SES waves in order to have sufficient sample 
size since some occupations were found to not have been sampled in the 2012 wave (combined 
N=8,644). In both SES and WERS, occupations are recorded in the Office for National 
Statistics’ 3-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC2000) schema which 
distinguishes 354 unique occupations, offering a fine-grained measure of the two occupational 
 
2 We also investigated using (i) the modal responses within each occupation and (ii) the percentage of respondents 
within an occupation reporting they are ‘very closely supervised’ and specialist knowledge as ‘essential’. Results 
were qualitatively in the case of the latter but not the former (available from the authors). In the case of (i), the 
results were nonsignificant. Further investigation revealed that modal scores do not adequately represent the 
variation across occupations given all most all occupations share the same modal scores as monitoring difficulty 
is measured on a 4-point scale, while asset specificity is measured on a 5-point scale. We thank a reviewer for 
suggesting this robustness check. 
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task dimensions.3 To facilitate interpretation, both items were standardized to have a mean of 
0 and a standard deviation of 1 (z-scores).4 
Analytical strategy 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. In the first step, we descriptively analyze the distribution 
of PFP across the two key independent variables. We then explore how 4-digit occupations are 
clustered according to their monitoring difficulty and requisite human asset specificity scores 
to explore the extent to which they are differentially bundled across occupations, as assumed 
by occupational class theory, such that sufficient numbers of occupations should be found in 
all quadrants of Figure 1. In the second step, we shift to a multivariable approach and test our 
hypotheses net of controls. More specifically, we test a series of models to ascertain whether 
monitoring difficulty and requisite human asset specificity have independent effects on PFP 
and whether their effects depend on the level of the other, as we predict. In the third and final 
step, we present a series of robustness checks on our main results. 
Since we are interested in understanding occupational differentiation in PFP within 
workplaces, in all multivariable analyses, we only focus on workplaces that have at least one 
PFP employee (about 50 per cent of workplaces). Additionally, within this subsample, we 
control for a large number workplace fixed-effects (one for each workplace). We therefore 
employ conditional fixed-effects logistic regression. Binary response methods such as the one 
we use are sometimes said to suffer from non-comparability of coefficients across differently 
specified models (Allison 1999). However, this issue only applies if one is interested in the 
underlying latent variable rather than the actual binary response itself (Kuha and Mills 2018). 
 
3 We also investigated collapsing these indicators by 2-digit (25 categories) and 3-digit SOC (81 categories) codes 
and found qualitatively similar results (available from the authors). We thank a reviewer for suggesting this 
robustness check. 
4 We also tried taking z-scores on just the sample of employees drawn from PFP workplaces and found 
qualitatively similar results (available from the authors). We thank a reviewer for suggesting this robustness check. 
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Results employing linear probability models that do not suffer from this potential issue found 
qualitatively similar results (available on request). Since we are primarily interested in 
occupational-level independent variables, we also implement robust clustered standard errors 
clustered on 4-digit occupations. Since we use a sample survey, we also apply the survey design 
weights in all analyses to ensure representativeness of estimates. Finally, we convert the log 
odds ratios from the regressions to a probability interpretation to facilitate interpretation by 
calculating average marginal effects (underlying coefficients available on request). 
In all multivariable analyses, we introduce a variety of standard control variables to 
scrutinize the associations uncovered: We include age (four categories), gender (dummy), 
whether reported being an ethnic minority (dummy), whether have any dependent children 
under 16 (dummy), the respondent’s educational qualifications (five categories), job tenure 
(five categories), whether the respondent has supervision duties (dummy), whether part-time 
contract (working fewer than 30 hours per week) (dummy), and whether the contract is 
temporary (dummy). These controls are important as PFP-use has been shown to depend on 
certain individual-level factors which may correlate with occupation such as ethnicity. 
Results 
Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 presents the information on the sample of employees in PFP workplaces (defined by 
whether a respondent receives PFP or straight pay). For comparison, information is also 
included on the subsample of employees in workplaces with no PFP as well as the combined 
sample in the final column. Within PFP workplaces (our population of interest), just over one 
in three employees received PFP. We find that PFP jobs have on average 0.25 standard 
deviations higher monitoring difficulty and 0.30 standard deviations higher requisite  human 
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asset specificity on average, while non-PFP jobs in PFP workplaces on average are lower than 
average along these two dimensions, providing preliminary support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
Having inspected the distribution of our key dependent variables, we now explore our 
two key independent variables a bit more to ascertain the extent to which they are analytically 
distinct constructs as predicted by Hypotheses 3 or whether they are two sides of the same coin. 
Figure 2 is a simple scatter plot of them. We find little evidence of ‘bunching’ of occupations 
along the diagonal of the two dimensions: high monitoring difficulty occupations are not 
necessarily high requisite human asset specificity occupations and vice versa—there appears 
to be a good level of dispersion. Indeed, both dimensions are only very weakly correlated with 
one another (r = 0.08, p = 0.05). It appears they are indeed quite analytically distinct. 
Nonetheless, there does appear to be definite clustering by occupation type, as 
suggested by occupational class theory. About 29 per cent of the combined sample (that is, 
employees in both PFP and non-PFP workplaces) are found in the upper-right quadrant—where 
we expect the probability of PFP to be greatest (Hypothesis 4). These are largely composed of 
managerial and professional occupations. The largest three occupations in this group are ‘sales 
accounts and business development managers’, ‘vocational and industrial trainers and 
instructors’, and ‘other business and related associate professionals’.  
Moving to the lower-left quadrant—where we expect the probability of PFP to be the 
lowest—we find most of these occupations are manual and routine (semi-routine and routine). 
The largest three occupations are ‘care workers and home carers’, ‘postal workers, mail sorters, 
messengers and couriers’, and ‘sales and retail assistants’. This quadrant also accounts for 
about 29 per cent of the combined sample. 
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The rest of the sample are found in the upper-left (26 per cent) and lower-right (15 per 
cent) quadrants. These are mostly ‘intermediate occupations’. The largest three occupations in 
the upper-left are ‘national government administrative occupations’, ‘secondary education 
teaching professionals’, and ‘nurses’, while the largest three in the lower-right are ‘other 
administrative occupations’, ‘cleaners and domestics’, and ‘personal assistants and other 
secretaries’. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]  
Multivariable analysis 
The multivariable analysis begins with examining the determinants of PFP within PFP 
workplaces in Table 2. In Columns 1 and 2, we include, respectively, only monitoring difficulty 
and requisite human asset specificity. Average marginal effects in both columns are positive 
and significant. They both remain significant and in the same direction when including them 
both together in Column 4. When introducing the controls in Column 5, they are both 
significant and positive, although their magnitude reduces somewhat. Nonetheless, Hypotheses 
1 and 2 are confirmed. 
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]  
 In substantive terms, in terms of monitoring difficulty, ‘occupational hygienists and 
safety officers’ (about one standard deviation above average) will have 2.6 percentage points 
higher probability than ‘carpenters and joiners’ (about average) of receiving PFP. In terms of 
requisite human asset specificity, the corresponding probability gap between ‘IT strategy and 
planning professionals’ (one standard deviation above average) and ‘nursing auxiliaries and 
assistants’ (about average) is about 5.8 percentage points. These may sound relatively small, 
but they are in the same order of magnitude as supervisory status, which has been the focus of 
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several PFP papers (Devaro and Kurtulus 2010; 2015). Importantly, the two occupational task 
dimensions show independent effects, supporting Hypotheses 3. 
Our final untested hypothesis is concerned with the interaction effects between 
monitoring difficulty and human asset specificity such that PFP probability will be greatest in 
those occupations characterized by both high monitoring difficulty and high requisite human 
asset specificity and that the effects of both will be small when the level of the other variable 
is very low (Hypothesis 4). To gauge this hypothesis, we do not report interaction effects given 
average marginal effects of interaction effects cannot be directly computed.5 To get handle on 
this, we report average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals of receiving PFP in 
Figure 3. Panel A reveals requisite human asset specificity only seems to have its positive effect 
on the probability of PFP when monitoring difficulty is not very low. In occupations where 
tasks are very easy to monitor, requisite human asset specificity makes little difference to PFP 
probability. In other words, even though an occupation may require  highly specialist and 
difficult-to-replace knowledge, organizations are no more likely to implement PFP if the 
tasksare also easily supervised and directly controlled (i.e., occupations in the upper-left 
quadrant of Figure 2). Similarly, Panel B reveals that even though an occupation may be 
characterized by work that is difficult to monitor, organizations are no more likely to use PFP 
if tasks require little specialist and difficult-to-replace knowledge (i.e., occupations in the 
lower-right quadrant of Figure 2). 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Heterogeneity by workplace size and industrial sector  
 
5 In a robustness check using linear probability models where interaction effects can be computed, the interaction 




We now explore heterogeneity in the statistical regularities revealed in the foregoing analysis. 
We present three alternative specifications to the main model in Column 5 in Table 2. First, we 
explore alternative ways of defining PFP. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 consider respectively the 
effect of monitoring difficulty and human asset specificity on detailed PFP systems (individual, 
group, and organization PFP). We find the same patterns hold as when considering whether an 
employee receives any one of them as in the main analysis. Column 4 examines whether an 
employee is subjected to two or more PFP types. These findings suggest monitoring difficulties 
and requisite human asset specificity not only predict whether an employee received PFP or 
not, but also the number of schemes they are subjected to. 
 [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In the second and third robustness checks, we examine whether the ‘occupational 
differentiation’ in PFP we have uncovered holds across different types of workplaces. We 
consider two important axes of workplace type with respect to PFP: workplace size and 
industrial sector (Table 4). Although we in effect treat them as control variables in the main 
analyses (through workplace fixed-effects), they could have important moderating effects on 
decisions to differentiate pay systems within organizations. Workplace size affects average 
workgroup size as well as the development level of the HR function. Since the marginal cost 
of implementing a pay schemes decrease as the number of employees covered grows, so does 
the cost of having several systems in a given workplace and differentiating them across job 
groups. As for industrial sector, strategic choice theorists trace the growth of PFP systems to 
the globalization of product market competition, which of course varies by sector. For 
workplace size, we find the same pattern of results as in the main analyses in Table 4. 
Interestingly, however, monitoring difficulty seems to have weaker effects in smaller 
workplaces, while requisite human asset specificity seems to have stronger effects in smaller 
workplaces. With respect to the former, this is likely because direct monitoring and control of 
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tasks is much easier in smaller workplaces as supervisors likely have fewer subordinates. With 
respect to the latter, smaller workplaces tend to have fewer opportunities for advancement and 
personal development than larger ones due to less developed HR systems, therefore the 
retention motivation of PFP for staff in more specialist roles is likely stronger there than in 
larger workplaces. Regarding the hypothesized interaction effect, the patterns are in line with 
the general expectations across different workplace size categories (available on request). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
For industrial sector (Table 4), however, we do find some departures. Monitoring 
difficulty and requisite human asset specificity seem to have no detectable effect in the public 
sector, but the other three sectors follow the expected patterns. This is perhaps because PFP 
has never been as developed in the public sector and the occupational concentration in the 
public sector likely explains much of the generally lower rates (Bryson, Forth, and Stokes 
2017). Nonetheless, the overall patterns of main effects and interaction effects are similar to 
our main analyses (available on request). 
Discussion and conclusions 
This article started out by arguing that while the compensation systems literature is replete with 
inter-organization accounts of compensation systems, they rarely offer much insight into what 
goes on beneath the organization-level. However, we also note that an emerging regularity in 
the small number of studies that focus on differentiation in the workplace takes on an 
occupational form (Bayo-Moriones et al. 2013; Yanadori and Kang 201). Drawing upon he 
sociological theory of occupational class, this article investigated the role of occupational 
characteristics in the use of PFP within a nationally-representative matched employer-
employee dataset for Britain. Our basic argument is that the wider occupational structure in 
which jobs are embedded is important for understanding intra-organizational dynamics in PFP 
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by way of the different kinds of tasks found in different occupations. Specifically, tasks are  
differentially bundled across occupations according to monitoring difficulty and requisite 
human asset specificity. These occupational task dimenions in turn positively and 
multiplicatively predict PFP-use within organizations. Even among different types of PFP, we 
find little difference in the structure of ‘occupational differentiation’ within workplaces—be 
they based on individual, team, or organizational performance. We also show that organizations 
generally differentiate PFP in this way across different workplace sizes and industrial sectors, 
although the public sector remains beyond the reach of the model we developed here. 
Our article makes two main theoretical contributions. First, it provides an account on 
intra-organization dynamics in PFP-use, drawing on influential theories in the field. We believe 
the model we develop could help understand the dividing lines in HR differentiation, in 
particular for compensation systems. Second, by focusing on the wider occupational structure 
in which jobs are embedded (which are in turn a collection of tasks), we provide a midrange 
account of PFP. Despite prior calls to develop more midrange contextual theories in 
understanding compensation systems (Heneman 2000), models are lacking. The occupational-
level is particularly interesting since it cuts across the more conventional organizational, 
sectorial, and national levels of contextual analysis (Johns 2006). In doing so, we introduce a 
structural variable constraining agency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) that is both intra- and 
inter-organizational. An occupational perspective offers a way of connecting micro processes 
with macro patterns. For instance, one reason for the growth in PFP might be technologically-
induced shifts to occupations in the upper-right quadrant of Figures 1 and 2 (largely managerial 
and professional occupations). By clarifying the how and why PFP varies across occupational 
groups, we hope it can bring the attention to managers the constraining nature of the wider 
occupational structure in what they operate and that not only are organizations subjected to 
organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), but also perhaps occupational 
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isomorphism. We hope that an occupational perspective will prove illuminating in this regard 
and recommend further integration with existing multi-level accounts in the compensation 
literature (e.g., Gooderham et al. 2018). 
For future research, while the theories developed here suggest a particular 
compensation is used in situations where it most suited, and, as Larkin, Pierce, and Gino (2012: 
1196) observe “firms often deviate from the most efficient systems and can make mistakes, in 
general the prevalence of systems and decisions is highly correlated with efficiency and 
effectiveness”, this may not be the case much of the time. The effect of deviating from 
‘occupational norms’ on performance outcomes therefore warrants further investigation, given 
PFP-use appears to be closely tied to occupation, more specifically, the sorts of tasks typically 
found in them. More generally, ooccupational differentiation in PFP within organizations may 
result in unhelpful negative attitudes between groups that are treated differently (Marescaux et 
al. 2013) as employees’ equity concerns may be more closely tied to their organizational than 
wider professional environment. Finally, it has been established that PFP jobs pay more. Given 
our research finds that PFP is more likely to be found in jobs in occupations where monitoring 
difficulty and requisite human asset specificity is high, which also are generally higher-paying 
occupations (i.e., managerial and professional), it highlights that PFP has the potential to 
increase overall wage inequality through increasing differentials both between and within 
occupations. We highlight these as areas for future investigation. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (means) 
 PFP workplaces Non-PFP 
workplaces 
All 




Pay for performance 0.36 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 
Individual 0.21 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Team  0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Organizational 0.18 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.10 
Monitoring difficulty 0.00 0.25 -0.13 0.08 0.03 
Human asset specificity 0.06 0.30 -0.07 -0.16 -0.03 
Age 20 to 29 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.20 
Age 30 to 39 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.24 
Age 40 to 49 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.30 
Age 50 to 59 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.25 
Female 0.48 0.41 0.52 0.63 0.54 
Ethnic 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 
Dependent children 0.40 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.41 
Degree or higher 0.34 0.43 0.30 0.35 0.34 
A-levels 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
GCSEs 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.35 
Other qualifications 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 
No qualifications 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Tenure <1 year 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 
Tenure >=1 years <2 years 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 
Tenure >=2 years < 5 years 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25 
Tenure >= 5 years <10 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 
Tenure >=10 years 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.27 
Supervisor 0.33 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.34 
Part-time 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.25 0.20 
Temporary contract 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.07 
% sample 54.6 17.3 37.3 45.4 100 
Notes: Data are weighted. 
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Table 2. Multivariable analysis of occupational differentiation in pay for performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monitoring difficulty 0.068*** 
(0.008) 

































Ethnic   0.002 
(0.022) 
  0.011 
(0.024) 
Dependent children   0.032* 
(0.015) 
  0.030 
(0.016) 




















Tenure >=1 years <2 years   0.036 
(0.031) 
  0.038 
(0.033) 
Tenure >=2 years < 5 years   0.030 
(0.025) 
  0.033 
(0.026) 
Tenure >= 5 years <10   0.049 
(0.025) 
  0.052 
(0.027) 
Tenure >=10 years   0.042 
(0.027) 
  0.048 
(0.029) 





Part-time   -0.012 
(0.024) 
  0.004 
(0.025) 





Pseudo-R2  0.011 0.023 0.041 0.029 0.052 
N employees 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471 
N workplaces 781 781 781 781 781 
Notes: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression models with average marginal effects reported. Reference 
categories for age and tenure are 20-29 and <1 year respectively. Robust standard errors clustered on 4-digit 
occupations in parentheses. Data are weighted.  




Table 3. Multivariable analysis of the occupational differentiation in detailed types of 
compensation systems 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 

























Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.049 0.071 0.095 
N employees 7,010  4,274 4,499 3,507 
N workplaces 617 360 386 284 
Notes: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression models with average marginal effects reported. Controls are 
omitted and are the same as Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered on 4-digit occupations in parentheses. Data are 
weighted.  
Statistical significance:  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 4. Multivariable analysis of occupational differentiation in compensation systems by 
workplace size 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Workplace size  Industry 



































Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.103 0.056 0.056  0.078 0.065 0.091 0.058 
N employees 2,172 2,792 3,507  1,992 2,284  1,773 2,422 
N workplaces 257 229 295  166 242 158 215 
Notes: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression models with average marginal effects reported. Controls are 
omitted and are the same as Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered on 4-digit occupations in parentheses. Data are 
weighted.  






Figure 1.  Monitoring difficulty, human asset specificity, and PFP 
 
Notes: Adapted from Goldthorpe (2007). 
 
Figure 2. Monitoring difficulty and human asset specificity across occupations 
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Figure 3. The moderating effects of monitoring difficulty and human asset specificity on 
each other in PFP 
Panel A: Moderating effect of monitoring difficulty on 
human asset specificity 
Panel B: Moderating effect of human asset specificity 
on monitoring difficulty 
 
 
Notes: Post-estimations an identical model to Model 5 in Table 2 with the addition of an interaction term between 
monitoring difficulties and human asset specificity. The figures can be interpreted as the variability in average 
marginal effects (AME) over levels of the interacted variable. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. Data are 
weighted. 
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